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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This case was initially brought by Syringa Networks, LLC ("Syringa") via six-count

complaint that alleged various violations of state competitive bidding laws, numerous contract
breaches, and tortious interference with contract. Since that time, Syringa' s Complaint against
the Idaho Department of Administration ("DOA"), ENA Services, LLC ("ENA"), and Qwest
Communications Company, LLC ("Qwest") has been reduced to one claim.
Count Three of Syringa's Complaint alleges a violation of I.C. § 67-5718A and 67-5718
by the DOA for issuing Amendments No. 1 to certain state purchasing contracts between the
DOA and ENA, and the DOA and Qwest regarding the Idaho Education Network.
This Court held in the earlier appeal that Syringa had standing to assert Count Three
relating to the DOA's issuance of Amendment No. 1 to Qwest. However, since this Cornt
announced that decision and remanded the case, this Court's holding has been seriously
misinterpreted by the District Cornt. Instead of taking this Court's decision for what it was-that
Syringa had standing to pursue Count Three as to Amendment No. 1 to Qwest-the District
Cou1t decided that this Court established the law of the case as to the merits of Count Three
against DOA, and against non-claim-joined parties ENA and Qwest. This led to the erroneous
grant of summary judgment to Syringa.
By failing to properly interpret the directive from this Court in the first appeal, the
District Cou1t has deprived the DOA of an opportunity to defend itself against the allegations in
Count Three of Syringa' s Complaint. As a result, the DOA respectfully requests this Court's
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attention to the legal and discretionary errors committed by the District Court discussed below,
and its reversal of the same.

B.

Factual and Procedural Background
1.

Prior to First Appeal

In 2008, the Idaho Legislature established the Idaho Education Network ("IEN").
Intended as "a high-bandwidth telecommunications distribution system for distance learning in
every public school in Idaho," the IEN included "the necessary elements for reliable and scalable
network access including hardware infrastructure, software, 24x7 technical monitoring and
support, and internet." R., p. 1114 (Affidavit of Greg Zickau <Jl 7); R., p. 1639 (Memorandum
Decision and Order Re: Pending Dispositive Motions). Consistent with its intended purpose, the
IEN provided Idaho students with "increased educational opportunities ... including students in
Idaho's most rural districts who [could have] access to the same opportunities as students in

i

Idaho's most urban districts." R., p. 1114 (Affidavit of Greg Zickau) .

.. !

In order to establish the IEN, the DOA "was given administrative oversight of the IEN,
including procuring telecommunication services and equipment for the IEN through an open and
competitive bidding process." Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 305 P.3d 499,
502 (Idaho 2013) (citing I.C. § 67-5745D(5)(h)) (intemal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). The DOA issued a Request for Proposals ("RFP") in December 2008, which was
amended in January 2009, and received a number of responses. Id. at 503. ENA, 1 Qwest, and

ENA and Syringa entered into a teaming agreement in conjunction with ENA's response to the DOA's RFP.
The teaming agreement sought to divide responsibilities between ENA and Syringa in the event ENA was awarded
the state contract. However, this Court affirmed the District Court's conclusion that the teaming agreement "was not
an enforceable contract" for want of price term, which was "a material term of the contract." Syringa Networks, 305
P.3d at 508.

(

··,

l
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Verizon Business Network Services, Inc. all submitted responsive proposals. Id.
On January 28, 2009, the DOA selected ENA and Qwest to provide services for the
implementation of lhe IEN. R., p. 1639 (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Pending
Dispositive Motions). This decision was memorialized through the execution of two "essentially
identical Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders ("SBPO")~ SBPO 1308 to Qwest, and SBPO 1309
to ENA." Id. SBPO 1308 and SBPO 1309 ("original SBPOs") "contained the same scope of
work, to perform the entire scope of the RFP requirements." Id. The award of identical services
to ENA and Qwest complied with the Idaho Statute, §67-5718A that permits multiple awards for
"same of similar" services.
At this juncture, the DOA sought to comply with its obligations under LC.§ 675718A(3): "Where a contract for property has been awarded to two (2) or more bidders in
accordance with this section, a state agency shall make purchases from the contractor whose
terms and conditions regarding price, availability, support services and delivery are most
advantageous to the agency." See also R., pp. 1122-23 (Affidavit of Greg Zickau 9[ 37-40). To
this end, the DOA' s Division of Purchasing "issued separate statements in order to clarify the
State's intended roles and responsibilities of the multiple award contractors for the
implementation of the high schools phase of the IEN." R., p. 1122 (Affidavit of Greg Zickau

'I[ 37). These statements were labeled "Amendment No. 1" with respect to SBPO 1308 and SBPO
1309, and were designed to ensure the DOA's compliance with LC. § 67-5718A(3) by
identifying the use of ENA's and Qwest's services in a maimer "most advantageous to the
agency." R., p. 1122-26 (Affidavit of Greg Zickau 'I[ 38-55).
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Amendments No. 1 "were not intended ... to be legal amendments to the initial awards
[and] did not change the tem1S of the initial awards." Id. Indeed, "[i]f the State had intended to
alter the terms of the SBPOs, [it] would have expressly included such language in the
amendments, and would have required ENA and Qwest to sign the amendments." R., p. 1126
(Affidavit of Greg Zickau <JI 55).
Because the Amendments No. 1 pertained only to one specific aspect of the IEN, many
school districts and numerous state agencies 2 purchased various services under the Original
SBPOs from ENA and Qwest-not under the Amendments No. 1. See R., p. 1124 (Affidavit of
Greg Zickau <JI 41-46); R., pp. 1191-94 (Affidavit of Bob Collie <JI 12-13 ). Were the Amench11ents
No. 1 intended to "do in two steps what was prohibited in one," Syringa Networks, 305 P.3d at
505, none of the foregoing orders directly from school districts and state agencies under the
Original SBPOs would have occurred. See R., p. 1124 (Affidavit of Greg Zickau ~[ 46).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Syringa sued the DOA; two department officers, J.
Michael Gwartney and Jack G. Zickau; ENA; and Qwest. The Vetified Complaint included six
causes of action: (1) breach of contract against the DOA; (2) violation of l.C. § 67-5726 by the
DOA (seeking declaratory relief); (3) violation ofI.C. §§ 67-5718A and 67-5718 against the
DOA (seeking declaratory relief); (4) t011ious interference with Contract against the DOA,
Gwartney, Zickau, and Qwest; (5) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage
against Qwest; and (6) breach of contract against ENA. Syringa wanted the award to Qwest for

2
"The agencies include: Health and Welfare, Labor; Liquor Dispensary; Vocational Rehabilitation; Tax
Commission; Juvenile Corrections; Fish and Game; Corrections; Health District I-III, V and VII; Environmental
Quality; Water Resources; Building Safety; PERSI; Insurance; Parks and Recreation; Veteran's Services and the
Idaho Supreme Court." R., p. 1117 (Affidavit of Greg Zickau <JI 15).
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itself, notwithstanding its failure to submit a responsive bid to the RFP and the invalidity of the
teaming agreement between it and ENA.
W11ile Syringa pursued these claims before the District Court and this Court on the first
appeal (as discussed further below), Syringa hedged its bets by entering into a Master Service
Agreement directly with Qwest (d.b.a. CenturyLink) to provide services for the IEN. See R., pp.
1318-20 (Affidavit of Elissa Homenock <J[ 2-8). Pursuant to this agreement, Syringa received
$1,438,367 from 2011 through 2013 alone for !EN-related services. R., p. 1319 (Affidavit of
Elissa Homenock ~I 7).
Syringa's numerous claims against the DOA were initially unsuccessful before the
District Court. With respect to the breach of contract claim against the DOA, the District Court
determined that Syringa failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the DOA
accepted the teaming agreement between ENA and Syringa. Counts two and three alleging
violations of Idaho competitive bidding laws were rejected because the District Court found that
Syringa, despite having standing to raise the claims, had failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies. Finally, the Comt held that Syringa failed to present sufficient evidence
that any of the state defendants acted outside of the course and scope of their employment or
acted with malice or criminal intent.3

2.

First Appeal

On Syringa' s appeal to this Court of the District Court's above decision, the issues
relevant to the DOA, as specifically stated by Syringa, were: (1) whether the District Court ened
in "holding, as a matter of law, that Syringa was barred, by failure to exhaust administrative

3

Qwest and ENA also prevailed on summary judgment, and Syringa's claims against them were dismissed.
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remedies ... from challenging the legality of post-award amendments to Statewide Blanket
Purchase Orders issued to prime contractors ENA and Qwest"; and (2) whether the District Court
erred in holding that Syringa failed to overcome the presumption that Gwartney and Zickau acted
within the scope of their employment, without malice and without criminal intent. In addressing
these issues in its Reply Brief, Syringa specifically conceded that "Syringa does not challenge
the Letter of Intent or the identical and lawful SBPOs issued to Qwest and ENA on January 28,
2009 because they did not split the IEN Project." See R., p. 1401.
The DOA in tum raised the separate issues of Syringa's standing and the DOA's
entitlement to attorney fees and costs, via cross-appeal.
This Court addressed these limited issues. First, this Court concluded that Syringa
"alleged a distinct and palpable injury, not suffered by all Idaho citizens, that is alleged to have
been caused by the challenged conduct and that can be redressed by judicial relief." Syringa
Networks, 305 P.3d at 506. "Therefore, Syringa has standing to challenge the amended

contract to Qwest because it constituted, in effect, changing the RFP after the bids were open."

Id. (Emphasis added).
Second, this Court held the District Comt "erred in dismissing count three of Syringa's
complaint on the ground Syringa failed to exhaust its administrative remedies," because Syringa
did not have any remedies to exhaust under the relevant statutory framework Id. at 506.
Next, this Court affirmed the District Court's holding that Syringa had failed to provide
sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact with respect to its tortious interference claim
against the DOA, Gwaitney, and Zickau: "Because the teaming agreement was not an
enforceable contract, these parties could not have committed the to1t of interfering with the
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alleged contract." Id. at 508.
Finally, this Court held that LC. § 12-117(1) "is not tl1e exclusive basis upon which to
seek an award of attorney fees against a state agency or political subdivision," and stated that
"On remand, the district court can reconsider whether the State Defendants are entitled to an
award of attorney fees under an applicable statute other than section 12-117(1 )." Id. at 511 .4
As a result of this Court's opinion in Syringa Networks, the only viable claim in
Syringa's Complaint was Count Three, with respect to which this Court held that "Syringa has

standing to challenge the amended contract to Qwest .... " Id. at 506. Because the dismissal of
all other counts in the Complaint was affirmed by this Court, all claims against ENA had been
dismissed and affirmed on appeal, effectively rendering ENA a non-party to the remanded
Complaint.

3.

Post-Appeal

Following remand, Syringa moved to file a First Amended Post Appeal Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial ("FAC"). R., pp. 61-525. In material effect, the FAC sought to modify
Count Three and Syringa's plea to seek a declaration that "the January 28, 2009 and February 26,
2009 IEN Purchase Orders to ENA and Qwest were issued in violation of Idaho Code§§ 67518A and 67-5718 and are void ab initio and permanently enjoining tl1e State from perfonning
thereunder." R., p. 77. Syringa fmiher sought to set aside tl1e judgment under Rule 60(b) in order
to allege a new claim against Gwartney and Zickau for tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage. R., p. 55 (Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motions to Amend).

This Court also found in favo!' of ENA and Qwest on all other issues on appeal, with the exception of reversing
the District Court's award of attorney fees to Qwest under I.C. § 12-120(3), because "there was no commercial
transaction between Qwest and Syringa." Syl'inga Networks, 305 P.3d at 506-10.

4
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Consistent with the DOA's Opposition to Syringa's motions, the District Court first held
that it would not set aside the judgment dismissing Gwartney and Zickau and would not allow
amendment of the Complaint to allege new claims against them R., p. 58. However, the District
Court held that Syringa could amend the Complaint as requested by Syringa with respect to
Count III against the DOA, ENA, and Qwest. R., p. 59. In so holding, the District Court rejected
the DO A's contention that allowing an amendment to the Complaint to add a claim against a
dismissed defendant would exceed the District Court's jurisdiction after a limited remand.
On the DOA's Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision, the District Court
agreed with the DOA that Syringa could not amend its Complaint to challenge the January 28,
2009 IEN Purchase Orders, i.e. the Original SBPOs: "Syringa did not seek any appellate review
of [the] rnling that Syringa had failed to pursue an administrative challenge to the bid awards. On
appeal, Syringa did not challenge the award of the original SBPOs, and conceded that the
original SBPOs were lawfuL" R., p. 1401 (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to
Reconsider). "Now, Syringa seeks to argue that the original awards were an unlawf1.1l pretext to
divide the scope of the work between Qwest and ENA. The doctrine of judicial estoppel
precludes Syringa from having it both ways." R., p. 1402.
The District Court also noted that it "entered a judgment in favor of ENA on the only
claim asserted against ENA in the original complaint, Count Six. This judgment has been
affinned upon appeal. In the Court's view, ENA is no longer a party because there is no claim
against ENA in the original complaint which has not been fully resolved." R., p. 1403. Yet,
despite the forgoing, the District Court held that "ENA must be made a party this action." Id.
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Finally, though the issue was not particularly relevant to resolving the DOA's Motion to
Reconsider, the District Court opined on the impact of certain language from the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision in Syringa Networks:
In deciding that Syringa had standing to challenge the amended
SBPO to Qwest, the Supreme Court stated a principle of law that
was necessary to its decision, i.e. that by improperly splitting the
IEN RFP scope of work between ENA and Qwest, DOA caused a
distinct and palpable injury to Syringa .... The Court's
determination that the amendment violated state law is not dicta.
The Court's determination that the amendment violated state law is
the law of this case and will be adhered to by this Court.
R., p. 1398.
Unsurprisingly, Syringa followed up this cue from the District Court with a Second
Amended Post-Appeal Complaint and a motion for summary judgment, claiming that this
Court's decision on the issue of standing meant Syringa was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on Count Three's merits. See R., pp. 529-53 (Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment). The DOA Opposed Syringa's Motion and filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment of its own. See R., pp. 1546-71, 1462-79. The gist of the DOA's Opposition and
Motion for Summary Judgment was that (1) because neither ENA nor Qwest were included as
parties to Count Three pre-appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court and the District Court lacked
jurisdiction to make a ruling adverse to either Qwest or ENA; (2) ENA should be dismissed from
the Complaint, which would necessitate dismissing the action; and (3) the mutual rescission of
Amendments No. 1 to the Original SBPOs 5 rendered Syringa's claim moot and unripe.

5

On July 15, 2014, the DOA and ENA executed Amendment No. 4, which rescinded Amendment No. l to SBPO
1309. R., p. 1457 (Affidavit of Bill Burns, Ex. A). On July 30, 2014, the DOA and Qwest executed Amendment No.
4, which rescinded Amendment No. l to SBPO 1308, R., p. 1460 (Affidavit of Bill Burns, Ex. B). Both
Amendments No. 4 made clear the rescission was to ''avoid any confusion or misperception concerning
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On October 10, 2014, the District Court heard argument on the respective Motions for
Summary Judgment. See R., Doc. No. 91 (Appeal Transclipt). It announced its decision on
November 11, 2014, granting Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and denying the
DOA's Motion for Summary Judgment. See R., pp. 1638-53 (Memorandum Decision and Order
Re: Pending Dispositive Motions).
First, the District Court held tl1at "all necessary parties have been joined and the Court
has jurisdiction." R., p. 1646.
Second, the District Court ruled tl1at, because "la]n agreement made in violation of the
state's procurement law cannot be fixed or cured," the Amendments No. 1 "dividing the scope of
work render these awards void," despite (1) the fact that Amendments No. 1 had been mutually
rescinded and (2) tl1e District Court's earlier holding (R., p. 1401) that Syringa could not
challenge the Original SBPOs. R., p. 1647, and (3) that the original SBPOs comply with LC.
§67-5718A.
Next, the District Court addressed ENA' s argument sounding in res judicata and judicial
estoppel that Count Three could not be leveled against ENA: "ENA is correct that Syringa did
not challenge the award to ENA in its Complaint, and did not seek to add this claim until after
the appeal." R., p. 1648. Yet, inexplicably, the District Court held tlrnt "ENA's arguments
c01Tectly state the law, but, in tl1e end, these arguments must be rejected." Id. The District Court
reached this conclusion on the questionable assumption that "[i]n Idaho, a court has an
affirmative duty to raise the issue of illegality at any stage in tl1e litigation, regardless of whether

Amendment[s] No. I," and that neither the DOA, ENA, nor Qwest, ''intended Amendmem[s] No. 1 to alter the
services available" from ENA or Qwest under the Original SBPOs.
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the issue was pleaded by a party." R., p. 1649 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, the District Court repeated its prior articulation of this Court's decision on
Syringa's standing to pursue Count Three of the Complaint, construing the standing decision as a
final adjudication on the merits of Syringa's Complaint and the DOA's defenses thereto. R., p.
1649. In effect, the District Court construed this Comt's decision on Syringa's standing to pursue
Count Three as a sua sponte directive to award Syringa summary judgment on Count Three.
As a result of the foregoing, the District Court held that "The Statewide Blanket Purchase
Order to Qwest (SBPO 1308), as amended by Amendment One, and the Statewide Blanket
Purchase Order to ENA (SBPO 1309), as amended by Amendment One, are void." R., p. 1651.
In light of the District Court's prior holding that Syringa was judicially estopped from
challenging the Original SBPOs (R., p. 1401), the DOA filed a Motion for Clarification and/or
Reconsideration of the District Court's decision to grant Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. R., pp. 1658-69. The DOA sought clarification on whether the District Court had
intended to hold that both the Original SBPOs and respective Amendments No. 1 were void, and
if so, requested re-consideration because (1) the law of the case precluded a finding that the
Original SBPOs were void; (2) by voiding the Amendments No. 1, whether via rescission or
ruling from the Court, the result should be a return to the Original SBPOs; and (3) the
severability provision of the Original SBPOs preserved the Original SBPOs, notwithstanding a
finding that Amendments No. 1 were void. Id.
In ruling on the DOA's motion, the District Court perpetuated its questionable conclusion
that in finding Syringa had standing to bring Count Three this Court had given an absolute
directive that Syringa must therefore prevail on the merits of Count Three. See R., p. 2033
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(Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motions to Reconsider). Indeed, the District Court held,
"Should any clarification be needed, the Court will find that because the original awards were
part of the process DOA used to violate procurement law, those original awards as amended are
void." Id. This conclusion was founded on the porous premises that (1) the District Court had "an
affirmative duty to raise the issue of illegality at any stage in the litigation, regardless of whether
the issue was pleaded by a party," id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and (2) this Court in
Syringa Networks, by virtue of its conclusion on the nairow issue of standing, found as a matter

of law for Syringa on the merits of Count Three. Id. Finally, the District Court tersely rejected
the DOA's severability argument: "DOA's contract language does not supplant Idaho Code Title
67 Chapter 57. Because the original awards were part of a process used to make an illegal award,
the process itself was flawed." R., p. 2034.
At this juncture, the District Court issued Judgment declaring both the Original SBPOs
and the Amendments No. 1 void on February 11, 2015. R., p. 2038 (Judgment and I.R.C.P. 54(b)
Certificate). Unsatisfied with obtaining the complete relief it had requested under Count Three,
Syringa moved the Court to amend the judgment, seeking to force the DOA to require ENA and
Qwest to repay to the state any funds advanced under the Original SBPOs and Amendments No.
1. See R., pp. 2070-79. The District Coutt rebuffed Syringa's overreach:

In the Court's view, the Judgment entered on February 11, 2015
provides Syringa the full relief requested in Count Three of the
Second Amended Post Appeal Complaint. ... This ruling complies
with the requirements of the Remittitur and grants complete relief
as to the remaining substantive claim as pied in Count Three of the
Second Amended Post Appeal Complaint. As an exercise of
discretion, the Court will not amend the judgment. ...
R., p. 2343 (emphasis added).
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Following rejection of Syringa's Motion to Amend the Judgment, Syringa requested
attorney fees and costs under J.C.§§ 12-117, 12-120(3) and 12-121. See R., pp. 2080-87
(Amended and Superseding Verified Memorandum of Costs and Request for Attorney Fees); R.,
pp. 2372-75 (Supplemental Verified Memorandum of Costs and Request for Attorney Fees). The
DOA moved to disallow costs and attorney fees to Syringa on the basis that Syringa was not a
prevailing party, the DOA's defense was not frivolous or lacking a reasonable basis in law or
fact, and Count Three did not involve a commercial transaction between Syringa and the DOA.
The District Court sided with Syringa. See R., pp. 2354-71 (Memorandum Decision and
Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion for An Award of Costs and Attorney Fees): R., pp. 2432-36
(Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Supplemental Judgment for Costs and Attorney Fees).
First, the District Court found that Syringa was the prevailing pmty vis-a-vis the DOA: "from the
overall view, while Syringa lost a number of preliminary battles, in the end, Syringa won the war
that mattered decisively." R., p. 2357. The District Court then found that the DOA was liable to
Syringa for attorney fees under each of LC.§§ 12-117, 12-120(3), and 12-121. Despite the DOA
having prevailed on all claims at the summary judgment stage pre-appeal, and offering a defense
that posed a novel question of Idaho competitive bidding law to Syringa's only surviving claim,
the District Court concluded that the DOA's defense following remand "lacked a reasonable
basis in law or fact" under I.C. § 12-117 and was "frivolous, unreasonable, and without
foundation" under I.C. § 12-121. R., pp. 2363, 2369. This conclusion was founded on the
pervasive premise that has dominated the District Court's reasoning in every decision postremand, namely that this Court's decision that Syringa had standing to pursue Count Three
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somehow meant that Syringa must prevail on Cowlt Three as a matter of law. See R., pp. 2363,
2368. Finally, the District Court held that
a commercial transaction is the gravamen of Count Three. The
commercial transaction is the solicitation and award of the design
and implementation of the Idaho Education Network. Due to
DOA's unlawful division of the scope of the work between Qwest
and ENA, Syringa has standing to challenge the awards. As the
prevailing party in the challenge to the award process, Syringa is
entitled to fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
R., pp. 2366-67. Unyielding, the District Court again based another holding on the premise that
this Court's decision regarding Syringa's standing meant that Syringa must prevail against the
DOA on Count Three, even with respect to attorney fees and the presence of a commercial
transaction. The foregoing reasoning also supported the District Court's decision that Syringa
was entitled to $20,000 in attorney fees for preparing its attorney fee request. See R., pp. 237275. In sum, the District Court awarded Syringa $930,896 in attorney fees and costs.
The DOA filed a timely notice of appeal on Febrnary 11, 2015, which it subsequently
amended on June 24, 2015 and July 10, 2015.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the District Court lacked jurisdiction under Idaho's Uniform Declaratory

Judgments Act because neither ENA nor Qwest were made party to Count Three pre-appeal.
2.

Whether the District Court lacked jurisdiction because the DOA's rescission of

Amendments No. 1 to SBPOs 1308 and 1309 rendered Syringa's sole claim moot and unripe.
3.

Whether the District Court erred in granting Syringa' s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment under the enoneous conclusion that this Court's decision on the first appeal
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established the law of the case not only with respect to the sole issues on appeal, standing and
administrative exhaustion, but also with respect to the merits of Count Three of the Complaint.
4.

Whether the District Court effed in granting Syringa's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment when it permitted Syringa to challenge not only the Amendments No. 1 to
the Original SBPOs, but also the Original SBPOs, despite the District Court's prior conclusion
that Syringa was judicially estopped from challenging the Original SBPOs.

5.

Whether the District Court erred in granting Syringa's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment when it held that it had an affirmative duty to invalidate the Original SBPOs
and Amendments No. 1 thereto, regardless of whether the issue was pleaded by a party.

6.

Whether the District Court erred in granting Syringa's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment where Syringa was attempting to invalidate a contract under which it reaped
substantial financial benefit.
7.

Whether the District Court committed legal error in denying the DOA's Motion

for Reconsideration of its Summary Judgment Decision and concluding that the severability
clause in the Original SBPOs did not sever the Amendments No. 1 therefrom.
8.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and

costs to Syringa as the prevailing party in the litigation under I.R.C.P. 54 and LC. §§ 12-117, 12120(3), and 12-121.

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Recognizing the inherent complexities in the prosecution and defense of this case, and the
absence of a commercial transaction between Syringa and the DOA, the DOA does not seek
recovery of attorney fees on appeal.
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IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review
1.

Motions for Summary .Judgment.

"On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the
same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion." Sqfaris
Unlimited, LLC v. Von Jones, 353 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Idaho 2015) (internal quotations omitted).
To that end summary judgment is only proper '"if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting I.R.C.P.
56(c)). In making this inquiry, the Court is bound to "liberally construe the facts, and draw all
reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Further, this Court exercises "free review" over questions of law. Id.

2.

Motions for Reconsideration.

"[W]ben reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration,
this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the lower court in deciding the motion for
reconsideration." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 281 P.3d 103,113 (Idaho 2012). "When deciding the
motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the
court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered." Id. As a result, "when
reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration following the grant of summary
judgment, this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material
fact to defeat summary judgment." Id.
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3.

Award of Costs and Attorney l<'ees.

Though "awarding attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and
subject to review for an abuse of discretion," Magleby v. Garn, 296 P.3d 400,402 (Idaho 2013),
a different standard applies to questions of law in this context: the "Court exercises free review."
Contreras v. Rubley, 130 P.3d 1111, 1114 (Idaho 2005).

A trial court abuses its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs where it fails to (1)
perceive "the issue as one of discretion"; (2) act "within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it"; or (3)
reach "its decision by an exercise of reason." Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power
Co., 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (Idaho 1991).

B.

The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Grant Syringa's Requested Relief.
The District Court erred in concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over this case

when it ruled on the cross motions for summary judgment. See R., p. 1646. Therefore, its
decision granting Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment must be reversed.
1.

The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction Following this Court's Partial
Remand Due to the Requirements of Idaho's Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act.

Because neither ENA nor Qwest were added as parties to Count Three of Syringa's
Complaint pre-appeal, declaratory relief prejudicial to them under Count Three could not be
given by this Court or the District Court-at crucial times in the proceedings both Courts lacked
.· l

t

subject matter jurisdiction. 6

"Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time." Dept. of Health a11d Welfare v. Housel, 90 P.3d
321,326 (Idaho 2004}; Cf id. ("This Court has narrowly construed the ability to void a judgment, however, on the
basis of a defect in a comt's subject matter jurisdiction.").

6
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Idaho has adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("UDJA"). Pursuant to
section 10-1211 of the UDJA, "[w]hen declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made
parties who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the declaration, m1d no
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding." Moreover, under
section 10-1206, the court "may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment" where such
judgment "would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."
Pursuant to those statutory provisions, a failure to join a necessary party deprives the
coUit of jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment. Courts interpret the UDJA's statement that
"all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the
declaration" as "set[ting) f01th ajurisdictional requiremellt." State ex rel. Dewberry v.

Kulongoski, 210 P.3d 884,891 (Or. 2009) (interpreting Oregon's analog of section 10-1211)
(emphasis added); see also e.g., Kendall v. Douglas, 820 P.2d 497,502 (Wash. 1991)
("Appellants' failure to join the Counties as required by RCW 7 .24.110 deprived the court of
jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief."); Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Stark-Tuscarawas-

Wayne Joint Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 920 N.E.2d 978,981 (Ohio 2009) ("The absence of a
necessary party to a lawsuit is a jurisdictional defect that precludes the court from rendering a
declaratory judgment."); Dunn v. Daub, 611 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Neb. 2000) ("[T]he presence of
necessary parties in declaratory judgment actions is jurisdictional and cmmot be waived, and if
such persons are not made pm·ties then the district court has no jurisdiction to determine the
controversy"); Stanley v. Mueller, 315 P.2d 125, 127 (Or. 1957) ("the courts have no authority to
make a declaration unless all persons 'who have or claim any interest which would be affected
by the declaration' are parties to the proceeding. Otherwise, there is no 'justiciable controversy'
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within the meaning of the statute.").? See also 22A Am. Jur.2d DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
§ 204, at 859 (2d Ed. 2013) ("A party's failure to join an interested and necessary party

constitutes a jurisdictional defect that precludes the court from rendering a declaratory
judgment.").
As parties to the contracts that Syringa seeks to void, there can be no dispute that Qwest
and ENA are necessary and indispensable parties to the claims Syringa sought to add in Count
Three. It is a "fundamental principle" that "a party to a contract is necessary, and if not
susceptible to joinder, indispensable to litigation seeking to decimate that contract."

Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1156-57
(9th Cir. 2002); see also e.g., Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975)
("[N]o procedural principle is more deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an action
to set aside a lease or a contract, all parties who may be affected by the determination of the
J

-

l,

action are indispensable"); Weissbard v. Potter Drug & Chem. Cmp., 69 A.2d 559,561 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1949), ajf'd 17 A.2d 629 (stating that "[a] contract may not be declared null and void

'J

in the absence of a party to the contract" and dismissing declaratory judgment complaint);

Wright v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 194 S.W.2d 459,461 (Tenn. 1946) (affirming the lower
court's sustaining of a demurrer to a complaint seeking a declaration that a charter and franchise
granted by city to defendant was invalid and illegal; "The non-joinder of necessary parties is
.. ./J

fatal on the question of 'justiciability' which, in a suit for a declaratory judgment, is a necessary
condition of judicial relief."); Louisville v. Louisville Auto. Club, Inc., 290 Ky. 241, 250, 160

Idaho appellate courts do not appear to have addressed whether section I0-1211 's requirements are mandatory
and jurisdictional, but section 10-1215 of the UDJA mandates that the act's provisions be interpreted "to make
uniform" the law of the states that have enacted it.

7

.,.

-~
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S.W.2d 663,668 (1942) (holding that where plaintiff sought a declaration that a contract was
invalid, court could not pass on validity of the contract because contractor had not been made a
party to the declaratory judgment action; "Persons whose interests are affected by declarations
must he made parties.").
When this Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the District Court's
decisions on the various motions for summary judgment filed by the Defendants in this case, the
only surviving claim was Count Three of Syringa's Complaint, which sought a declaratory
judgment against the DOA regarding the invalidity of the Amendment No. 1 to SBPO 1308 to
Qwest. All claims against ENA had been summarily dismissed, which dismissal was affirmed on
appeal. See also R., p. 1403 (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider) ("In
the Court's view, ENA is no longer a party because there is no claim against ENA in the original
complaint which has not been fully resolved."). Further, though this Court stated that Syringa
I

.l

had standing to "challenge the amended contract to Qwest," Syringa Networks, 305 P.3d at 506,
no claims against Qwest survived the appeal either. As ENA and Qwest were paities to the
Original SBPOs (and allegedly parties to the Amendments No. 1 despite not having signed
them), but neither were named in Count Three of the Complaint, neither this Court nor the
District Court had authority under Idaho's UDJA to grant Syringa any relief prejudicial to ENA
or Qwest as parties to the contracts in question.
Syringa' s remaining claim should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction by the District Court on remand. Therefore, the District Court's grant of summary
judgment to Syringa must be reversed.
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2.

The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction Following the Rescission of
Amendments No.1 to the SBPOs 1308 and 1309.

The District Com1 also lacked subject matter jurisdiction at the time it granted Syringa' s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, because the DOA, ENA, and Qwest, mutually rescinded
Amendments No. 1 to the Original SBPOs.
Pursuant to Idaho's UDJA, LC. §10-1202, "Any person interested tmder a ... written
contract ... , or whose rights, status or other relations are affected by a statute[or] contract ... ,
may have detennined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... statute [or]
contract ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder."
However, a court's jurisdiction under section 10-1202 is limited to cases "where an actual or
justiciable controversy exists," and courts are thus precluded "from deciding cases which are
purely hypothetical or advisory." Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation District, 297 P.3d 1134,
1143 (Idaho 2013) (quoting Wylie v. Idaho Tra11Sp. Bd., 253 P.3d 700, 705 (Idaho 2011)).
This Court has explained that a justiciable controversy is:
distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or
abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. ... A
controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of the parties having adverse legal interest. ... It must be
a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from
an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.
Bettwieser, 297 P.3d at 1143 ( quoting Davidson v. Wright, 151 P.3d 812, 816 (Idaho 2006)).

Whether an issue is moot is to be determined at the time of the court's trial or hearing,
and not at the time of commencing the action. Id. The BetMieser court stated that, "A litigant
seeking a declaratory judgment must demonstrate that an actual controversy exists and that the
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requested relief will provide actual relief, not merely potential relief." Bettwieser, 297 P.3d at
1143-44. Therefore, "an action for declaratory judgment is moot where the judgment, if granted,
would have no effect either directly or collaterally on the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be unable
to obtain further relief based on the judgment and no other relief is sought in the action." Id.
(quoting Wylie, 253 P.3d at 706).
In Wylie, the court held that Wylie was not entitled to a declaratory judgment because
there was no justiciable controversy. Wylie sought a declaratory judgment invalidating an
ordinance that limited his access to a state highway. Regarding justiciability, the court held that:
Wylie has been unable to articulate how a judgment declaring the
Ordinance invalid would provide him any relief. The Agreement
clearly precludes direct access to SH20-26 in the provisions of the
Agreement are not dependent upon the Ordinance. Further, even if
we were to declare the Ordinance invalid ITD has denied Wylie's
encroachment permit, which would still preclude his desired
access.
Wylie, 253 P.3d at 708. When Wylie argued that if the court invalidated the ordinance, he would

have an opportunity to petition to the state for an access point, the court held that"[ al remote
contingency is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements for a justiciable controversy." Id.
The District Court lacked jurisdiction to grant Syringa' s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Count Three because the issue is mooted by the mutual rescission of Amendments
No. l. "When conduct sought to be redressed by either declaratory or injunctive relief if peculiar
to a particular event that has already occurred, the finality of the event in a manner incapable of
repetition moots the controversy." See Zingiber Inv., LLC v. Hagennan Higlnvay Dist., 249 P.3d
868, 878 (Idaho 2011) (quoting 22 A. Am. Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments §36(2003)); see also
Euclid Ave. Trust v. City of Boise, 193 P.3d 853, 857 (Idaho 2008) ("A case is moot if it presents
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no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no practical effect upon the
outcome."). The Zingiber court explained that "Mootness ... applies when a favorable judicial
decision would not result in any relief. This Court may only review cases in which a judicial
detennination will have a practical effect on the outcome." Zingiber, 249 P.3d at 878 (quoting
Fenn v. Noah, 133 P.3d 1240, 1244 (Idaho 2006)).

In Zingiber, this Court reached its conclusion of mootness because:
The pe1mit issued by the District authorized Lyn Clif to construct a
pipe. That pipe has already been constructed. Avoiding the permit
would not provide Zingiber the relief it requests. This is a
declaratory judgment action, not an action for damages, and thus
Zingiber can make no argument for damages in regard to this
proceeding. Therefore, the issue of standing is now moot and this
court does not address it.
Id.

Additionally, Idaho courts will only issue declaratory judgments in actions that are ripe
for adjudication. ABC Agra, LLC v. Critical Access Group, Inc., 331 P.3d 523,525 (Idaho 2014);
Paddison Scenic Properties, Family Trust, L.C. v. Idaho County, 278 P.3d 403, 406 (Idaho

2012); see Wylie, 253 P.3d at 705. "Ripeness asks whether there is any need for court action at
the present time." Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 778 P.2d 757, 764 (Idaho 1989). "The traditional
Ripeness Doctrine requires a petitioner or plaintiff to prove (1) that the case presents definite and
concrete issues, (2) that a real and substantial controversy exists, and (3) that there is a present
need for adjudication." Paddison Scenic Properties, 278 P.3d at 406 (quoting Noah v.
Cenarrusa, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (Idaho 2002)).

In the instant action, because the DOA, ENA, and Qwest mutually rescinded the
Amendments No. 1 to the Original SBPOs, which formed the subject matter of Count Three
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against DOA as to Amendment No. 1 to Qwest only, the action was not ripe for adjudication and
the issue is moot. Mootness and ripeness principles require that the plaintiff's alleged injury
continue throughout the litigation. As a result, even if a plaintiff can demonstrate the requisite
"distinct palpable injury" at the commencement of the litigation, when the circumstances change
during the pendency of the litigation such that the injury no longer exists, the case becomes moot
and is properly dismissed by the court. See id; Arizonas for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.
43, 67 (1997); Donnan v. Young, 332 P.2d 480,481 (Idaho 1958) ("[WJhen, pending an appeal
from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs
which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to
grant him any effectual relief whatever, the comt will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will
dismiss the appeal") (quoting Coburn v. Thornton, 164 P. 1012, 1014-15 (Idaho 1917)).
Count Three of Syringa's Second Amended Post Appeal Complaint sought to void the
Febrnary 26, 2009 Amendments No. 1. Further, Syringa was judicially eslopped from
challenging the Original SBPOs. Therefore, al the rescission of the Amendments No. 1, there
was no longer an issue to be decided under Count Three at the time the District Court granted
Syringa's motion and no "present need for adjudication," given the mutual rescission of the
Amendments No. I-effectively the very relief Syringa sought through Count Three. As a result,
the District Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by Syringa, and the
District Court's judgment to the contrary must be reversed.

C.

The District Court Erred in Granting Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
The District Court committed numerous legal errors in granting Syringa's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment, including misapplying the law of the case doctrine, ignoring its
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previous holding regarding the law of the case, and overlooking the impact of a contractual
severability clause on amendments to otherwise valid contracts.
1.

The District Court Erred in Holding that This Court's Opinion in the First
Appeal Established the Law of the Case beyond the Issues Addressed on
Appeal.

A motion for summary judgment is designed to allow a court to ascertain the presence of
factual disputes and determine whether or not the case may be decided as a matter of law. Here,
the District Court undertook neither inquiry. Instead, it erroneously held that this Court's
decision that Syringa had standing to pursue Count Three of the Complaint somehow meant that
Syringa was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits, simply because Syringa had
standing. In other words, the District Court construed the Syringa Networks opinion as a sua

sponte grant of summary judgment to Syringa. To so hold is reversible error.
The law of the case doctrine only extends to "legal pronouncements and holdings
necessary to decide the particular issue presented. It is similar to the doctrine of stare decisis,
which requires that a statement of law be necessary to the ultimate disposition of the case in
order to be binding on the lower courts. Otherwise, the statement is considered to be dictum and
not controlling." Sun Valley Ranches v. Prairie Power Coop., 856 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1993) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Hawkins, 305 P.3d 513, 516-17 (Idaho
2013).
Because standing and administrative exhaustion are threshold, preliminary questions of
subject matter jurisdiction, they are necessarily determined ''before reaching the merits of the
case." Wasden v. State Bd. of Land Comm'n, 280 P.3d 693,697 (Idaho 2012) ("Standing is a
preliminary question to be determined by this Court before reaching the merits of the case.")
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(quoting Young v. City of Ketchum, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (Idaho 2002)). As a result, when an
appellate court has before it only threshold jurisdictional matters such as standing, any
commentary on the merits is necessarily dicta. See United Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO-

CLC v. Johnson, 799 F.2d 402, 404 (8th Cir. S.D. 1986) ("The District Court in Block, having
disposed of the case, then discussed its views of the Union's constitutional and preemption
claims. Because the case was decided upon the Union's lack of standing, those views remain
dicta and cannot be the law of that case, or this.") (internal citation omitted.)
Indeed, it is black-letter law that standing is a threshold issue and that the standing
inquiry focuses "not on the merits of the issues raised, but upon the party who is seeking the
relief." Mueller v. Hill, 345 P.3d 998, 1002 (Idaho 2015) (quoting Bagley v. Thomason, 241 P.3d
979,981 (Idaho 2010)); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978)
("[S]tanding focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have
adjudicated"). Put simply, the standing inquiry "in no way depends on the merits" of a party's
claim. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
It is also black-letter law that an appellate court "does not consider an issue not passed
upon below." Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); see also In re Estate o.f O'Brien, 262
P. 152, 153 (Idaho 1927) ("A comt of last resort requires the record before it in order to take
jurisdiction because its action is limited by the scope of the record."); In re Estate of Mc Vay, 93
P. 28, 32 (Idaho 1908) ("It is axiomatic that a cause or an issue cannot be tried de novo that has
never been tried.") This principle derives from the Constitutional demarcation of appellate from
original jurisdiction. See IDAHOCONST. art. V, § 9; McVay, 93 P. at 32 ('"Appellate
jurisdiction ... is the direct antithesis of the words 'original jurisdiction'").
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Pursuant to these well-defined boundaries, this Court, like other appellate courts, "is not a
fact-finding court with regard to its appellate jurisdiction." Stecklein v. Montgomery, 570 P.2d
1359, 1363 (Idaho 1977) (Bistline, J. concurring); see also Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Green,
54 P.3d 948, 951 (Idaho 2002) (noting the trial judge's "role as trier of fact" and that "lr]eview
of the trial judge's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings
of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law") (citing Conley v.
Whittlesey, 985 P.2d 1127 (Idaho 1999)). Indeed, an appellate court engaging in fact-finding

would be tantamount to improperly exercising an exercise of original, rather than appellate,
jurisdiction. See Stecklein, 570 P.2d at 1363 (Bistline, J. concmTing) ("[A]ppellate review is
properly directed[lO] to ascertaining whether the findings support the conclusions, and whether
the evidence supports the findings").
The rule that an appellate court restricts its consideration of issues to those actually
passed by the trial court is "essential in order that parties may have the opportunity to offer all
the evidence they believe relevant to the issues and in order that litigants may not be surprised on
appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce
evidence." Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120; see also Sun Valley Shamrock Res. v. Travelers Leasing
Co,p., 794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Idaho 1990) ("In an appellate review of a trial court decision we

must always keep in mind the respective roles assigned to the courts.").
For these reasons, an appellate comt's resolution of the merits of a claim when presented
only with a threshold issue such as standing is "an unacceptable exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction." Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120; see also Hill v. Houston, 764 F.2d 1156, 1159-1160
(5th Cir. 1985) ("[I]t is not proper for the court to consider the likelihood of success on the
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merits in determining the plaintiff's standing to proceed"). Indeed, any commentary on the
merits is inappropriate given that an appellate court reviewing the standing issue is constrained to
accept as trne all allegations in the complaint. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
In Singleton, a petitioner whose complaint had been dismissed in the district court for
lack of standing appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. That Court reversed and held
that the petitioner had standing to challenge a statute as unconstitutional. But the court also
proceeded "beyond the issue of standing to a resolution of the merits of the case." 428 U.S. at
119. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the ruling that the petitioner had standing but
reversed the appellate court's detennination of the merits: the Court of Appeals' decision to
proceed to the merits was "an unacceptable exercise of appellate jurisdiction." Id. at 119-120.
In this case, the District Court initially granted the DOA's motion for summary judgment

regarding Count Three on the threshold issue of administrative exhaustion. As a result, the merits
of that Count were never briefed or argued to this Court on the first appeal, and the record is
devoid of evidence regarding the merits-at least evidence from the DOA. 8 As a result, when
Syringa appealed, this Court had no record to review-and the DOA presented no argument or
briefing-regarding the merits. The only issues before this Court were the threshold questions of
whether Syringa could pursue Count Three at all: did Syringa have standing, and did Syringa fail
to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing suit? The merits-whether DOA violated

To date, the DOA has not been given an opportunity to present and argue evidence substantiating its defenses to
Count Three of Syringa's Complaint, including evidence demonstrating that the Amendments No. I were never
signed by ENA and Qwest, evidence that the Original SBPOs, and not the Amendments No. I, have been the means
by which numerous state agencies and school districts have purchased services from ENA and Qwest, and evidence
that Syringa has accepted substantial benefits from the very contracts it is attacking.

8

}
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the bidding statutes-were not briefed, raised, or argued. Indeed, Syringa acknowledged in its
Reply Brief on the first appeal that DOA made no argument regarding the merits of its actions.
Like the Eighth Circuit in Singleton, this Court was presented with an appeal from a final
decision dismissing the case below on threshold grounds. Like the petitioner in Singleton, the
DOA here "has never been heard in any way on the merits of the case" and was "justified in not
presenting those arguments" to this Comt, given the procedural posture of the case. 428 U.S. at
120. Like the Eighth Circuit, this Comt had "no idea what evidence, if any, [the DOA] would, or
could, offer in defense of' the IEN award process because the DOA "has had no opportunity to
proffer such evidence." Id. As a result, the District Court's decision to construe this Court's
conclusion that Syringa had standing to pursue Count Three as a finding on the merits of Count
Three is reversible e1Tor.
Indeed, giving this effect to this Court's conclusion regarding Syringa' s standing would
not just run afoul of the law of the case doctrine, it would also transform that decision into an
"unacceptable exercise of appellate jurisdiction" and would be tantamount to a premature
decision on the merits of a claim prior to any briefing or argument on the merits, in clear
contravention of the United States Supreme Court's admonition that an appellate court must
refrain from addressing issues not passed on below as "essential in order that parties may have
the opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues and in order that
litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have
had no opportunity to introduce evidence." Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120.
Importantly, this Court has recognized and reiterated that standing and the merits are
distinct inquiries post-Syringa Networks. See, e.g., Mueller, 345 P.3d at 1002; State v. Philip
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Morris, Inc., 354 P.3d 187, 194(Idaho2015); Urrutia v. Harrison, 330 P.3d 1035, 1038 (Idaho
2014); Bagley v. Thomason, 307 P.3d 1219, 1222 (Idaho 2013).
For these reasons, the District Court en-ed by interpreting this Court's holding regarding
Syringa's standing as a "directive" to grant Syringa judgment as a matter of law on Count Three
of the Complaint. As a result, its grant of summary judgment to Syringa must be reversed.

2.

The District Court Erred in Invalidating Not Only Amendments No. 1 to the
Original SBPOs 1308 and 1309, But Also the Awards Made Effective under
the Original SBPOs.

In granting Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the District Court also
committed reversible error in holding that not only the Amendments No. 1 were void, but also
the underlying SBPOs 1308 and 1309. This holding is inconsistent with the law of the case
established by this Court and the District Court and in discord with contract law principles
addressing the impact of a void or rescinded amendment on the underlying contract. As a result,
the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Syringa must be reversed.

a)

The Impact of a Void or Rescinded Amendment to a Valid Underlying
Contract is a Return lo the Underlying Contract Prior to Its
Amendment.

As discussed above, the District Court erroneously concluded that the law of the case
doctrine dictated its grant of summary judgment on Count Three to Syringa. That holding is e1ror
that must be reversed. However, even were the Amendments No. 1 found to be void this
conclusion does not implicate, tarnish, or taint the otherwise lawful underlying Original SBPOs.

In Knowlton v. Mudd, 775 P.2d 154 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989), the Idaho Court of Appeals
addressed an analogous factual scenario. There, a woman sold a piece of real property to her son.
Id. at 155. After five years, the son stopped paying his mother on the loan. Id. The mother had
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become mentally and physically debilitated, however, so she did not enforce her son's loan
obligations. Id. When the woman's daughter was appointed conservator of her mother's estate,
the son presented his mother with an amendment to the real estate contract that would reduce the
balance of the loan, forgive unpaid interest, reduce the loan's interest rate, and lengthen the loan
term. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision that the amendment to the
contract was void, because the mother was incapacitated when she signed it. Id. at 156. Tellingly,
the Court did not hold that the amendment nullified the entire contract. Id.
Likewise, this Court has held that void "contracts are deemed never to have existed in the
eyes of the law." S. Idaho Realty-Century 21 v. Larry J. Hellhake & Assocs., 636 P.2d 168, 173
(Idaho 1981). Thus, whether the Amendments No. 1 are rescinded or void, they are deemed nonexistent, and all that remains is the original SBPOs, which the District Court has unequivocally
held caimot be challenged as unlawful. See R., p. 1401. This position is consistent with many
other states' law. See, e.g., Empiregas Inc. of Ardmore v. Hardy, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3167
at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. February 27, 1987) ("'[I]f the substituted contract is voidable, it discharges
the original duty until avoidance, but [on] avoidance of the substituted contract the original duty
is again enforceable."') (quoting Rest. 2d Contracts§ 279 cmt. b (1979)); id. ('"[T]he avoided
contract is nullified both as an executory contract and as a discharge. The prior claim then
becomes enforceable."') (quoting Corbin, Corbin on Contracts§ 1293, at 196 (1962));Blake v.
Buck, 587 P.2d 575,577 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) ("A void contract cannot legally modify or

extinguish an earlier valid contract, thus the original agreement remains in effect and can be sued
upon.") (citing 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interest & Usury§ 247 (1969)); Shinn v. Edwin Yee, LTD., 553
P.2d 733, 745 (Hawaii 1976) (A "void and unenforceable" agreement to modify an original
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contract "could have no effect and the original contract must stand."); Spellman v. Rulule, 137
N.W.2d 425,428 (Wis. 1965) ("The trial court properly concluded that the 1963 agreement must
be considered viable upon the demise of the 1964 agreement."); Tillman v. Talbert, 93 S.E.2d
101 (N .C. 1956) ("A subsequent ii legal agreement by the parties cannot affect a previous fair and
lawful contract between them in relation to the same subject. The change is regarded as a mere
nullity, and as such cannot scathe the original contract."); In re Hellwig's Estate, 34 N.Y.S. 2d
876,877 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1942) ("A subsequent illegal arrangement would not infect with
invalidity contracts between parties made prior to the initiation of any such atTangement and
im10cent of any connection with it."); Ferkin v. Bd. of Educ., 15 N.E. 2d 799, 800 (N.Y. 1938)
(Because "original agreements were supported by consideration and [were] not dependent upon
the new agreement for suppo1t," the fact that the new agreement was an "illegal contract" could
not "nullify[] the previous legal contract."); McCurdy v. Dillon, 98 N.W. 746, 748 (Mich. 1904)
("If a valid contract for retainer fees was in fact made, it would not be abrogated because an

attempt was made to merge it in a void contract.").
Further, this Comt's decision in Syringa Networks supports the DOA's position. There,
this Court held, inter alia, that ( 1) Syringa was not challenging the original SBPOs, 305 P.3d at
504, (2) Syringa had "standing to challenge the amended contract to Qwest," id. at 506, and (3)
Syringa did not have any "administrative remedy to challenge the amendment to ENA's
fQwest's][sic] contract," id. The only way to consistently read this decision is to conclude that
Syringa may challenge the Amendments No. 1, but not the original SBPOs.
Where the validity of the original SBPOs is so clearly established, the voiding of the
Amendments No. 1 cannot "infect with invalidity" the original SBPOs. See In re Hellwig's
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Estate, 34 N.Y.S. 2d at 877. Rather, "the original [SBPOs] must stand." Shinn, 553 P.2d at 745.

As a result, under South Idaho Realty-Century 21 and Knowlton, the District Court erred in
concluding that Syringa' s claim in Count Three necessitated invalidating both the Amendments
No. 1 and the Original SBPOs.

b)

The District Court Erred by Failing to Abide by the Law of the Case
Estopping Syringa From Challenging the Original SBPOs.

The law of the case and the doctrine of judicial estoppel preclude Syringa from directly
challenging the original SBPOs. However, in construing the Amendments No. 1 as tainting the
Original SBPOs, the District Court al lowed Syringa to achieve indirectly relief which it cannot
obtain directly.
A brief review of this case's procedural history cements this point. On July 23, 2010, the
District Court issued its Substitute Memorandum Decision and Order, which, inter alia, granted
summary judgment "to the State Defendants on ... the requests for declaratory relief as alleged
in Count ... Three of the complaint," because Syringa failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies. In then ruling on Syringa's motion to reconsider that decision, the Court rejected
Syringa's contention9-that administrative remedies were unavailable spec(fically with respect to
the Amendments No. 1-"These amendments were effectively the awards. Syringa did not
exhaust its administrative remedies in challenging these awards and cannot now resort to the
court to challenge the awards."

9

In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, Syringa "acknowledge[<l] that the administrative
appeal requirements of Idaho Code § 67-5733 apply to bid specification challenges and to award challenges," and
agreed with the Court that it had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with respect to the original SBPOs.
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Syringa appealed this decision to the Idaho Supreme Court. In its opening brief, it framed
the issue on appeal as:
Did the distdct court err in holding, as a matter of law, that Syringa
was barred, by failure to exhaust administrative remedies set out in
Idaho Code§ 67-5377(1)(c), from challenging the legality of postaward amendments to Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders issued
to prime contractors ENA and Qwest that violated Idaho Code
§ 67-5718A ... ?
Plaintiff/Appellant's Opening Br. (First Appeal) at 28 (emphasis added). In addition, Syringa
repeatedly reiterated that it was not challenging the original SBPOs:

Both SPBOs complied with Idaho Code § 67-571 SA because they
were issued for the entire IEN Project, could accommodate
"vetiical" end-to end solutions, and were for the "same or similar"
property .... The original SBPOs allowed competition as
contemplated by LC.§ 67-5718A.
Plaintiff/Appellant's Opening Br. at 16 (emphasis added).
The only remedy available to Syringa, as a subcontractor to the
holder of a state SBPO harmed by post-contract conduct, was to
sue and seek a declaratory ruling that the amended SBPOs violated
the law.
Plaintiff/Appellant's Opening Br. at 32 (emphasis added).
Nothing in the statute provides that appeal can be taken.from the
amendment of a state Contract or SBPO .... I.C. § 67-5733 does not
apply to post award Contracts or Contract amendments.
Plaintiff/ Appellant's Opening Br. at 36 (emphasis added).
Syringa does not challenge the Letter of Intent or the identical and
lawful SBPOs issued to Qwest and ENA on January 28, 2009
because they did not split the IEN Project.
Plaintiff/Appellant's Reply Br. (First Appeal) at 8 (emphasis added).
Syringa's consistent litigation position did not go unnoticed by this Court either: "On
appeal, Syringa does not challenge the multiple award." Syringa Networks, 305 P.3d at 504
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(emphasis added). This Court also made clear that "The initial contracts to ENA and Qwest on
January 28, 2009, constituted an award to two bidders to furnish the same or similar property.
The material provisions of their contracts were identical. There was no differentiation as to the
scope of work each was to perform under their respective contracts." Id.
Next, in ovem11ing the District Court's decision that Syringa had failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies, this Com1 concluded that Idaho Code§ 67-5733 "did not provide
Syringa with any administrative remedy to challenge the amendment to ENA's lQwest's][sic]
contract." Id. at 506. After surveying the provisions of section 67-5733, this Court noted that
"[n]one of those administrative remedies permit the challenge being made by Syringa here," id.,
namely "the legality of post-award amendments to Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders,"
Plaintiff/Appellant's Opening Br. (First Appeal) at 28.
However, this Court's decision left untouched the District Court's conclusion that
Syringa had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies with respect to the original
SBPOs. Likewise, this Court's finding of standing extended only to Syringa's challenge to the
Amendments No. 1. Indeed, the District Court initially recognized as much: "the Supreme Comt
agreed that Syringa had standing to file a legal challenge to the amendment which divided the
scope of work. However, its discussion of standing raises doubt as to whether Syringa would
have standing to challenge the original awards of the SBPOs." R., p. 1402 n.6 (Memorandum
Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider).
Completely consistent with the foregoing, the District Court rejected Syringa's attempt at
"having it both ways" when Syringa tried to challenge both the Amendments No. 1 and the
original SBPOs in its First Amended Post Appeal Complaint. First, the District Com1 foW1d that
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/CROSS-REPSPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION'S OPENING BRIEF- 35
01152.0105 7690645.2

Syringa had waived any challenge to its finding that Syringa had failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies with respect to the original SBPOS: "Syringa conceded that the
administrative appeal provisions of Idaho Code§ 67-5733 applied to Syringa in this case.
Further, S yringa conceded the c01Tectness of the Court's determination that Syringa had and
failed to exhaust an administrative remedy to challenge ... the award of the SBPO to Qwest." R.,
p. 1400 (internal citations omitted). Second, the District Court found that "lo )n appeal, Syringa
did not challenge the award of the original SBPOs, and conceded that the original SBPOs were
lawful." R., p. 1401. Therefore, the District Court determined that "[t]he doctrine of judicial
estoppel precludes Syringa from having it both ways. Because Syringa has previously conceded
that the original SBPOs were lawful, Syringa will be estopped from taking the opposite position
now." R., p. 1402.
The law of the case could not be clearer: the District Court held that (1) Syringa may not
challenge the lawful original SBPOs; (2) Syringa does not have standing to challenge the lawful
original SBPOs; and (3) Syringa has concededly failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies with respect to the original SBPOs. Yet, inexplicably, the District Court granted
Syringa's motion for summary judgment and clarified its position as calling for the invalidation
of both the Amendments No. 1 and the Original SBPOs. See R., p. 2033. In holding that the
Amendments No. 1 "tainted" the valid Original SBPOs, the District Court has violated the law of
the case and allowed Syringa to do in two steps what it could not do in one.
The District Court's error is confirmed by a careful review of Count Three of Syringa's
Second Amended Post-Appeal Complaint, which sought invalidation of only the "February 26,
2009 IEN Amended Purchase Orders to ENA and Qwest." In the First Amended Post-Appeal
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Complaint, Syringa sought to challenge both the January 28, 2009 and the February 26, 2009
IEN Amended Purchase Orders. By disallowing this expansive amendment on the basis of
judicial estoppel (as described in detail above), the District Court limited the relief Syringa could
obtain under its Complaint: only the February 26, 2009 Amendments were open to challenge.

In holding otherwise, the District Court violated the law of the case it and this Court had
clearly established with respect to the Original SBPOs, and around which the DOA contemplated
and coordinated its defense of Syringa's lawsuit. See Swanson v. Swanson, 5 P.3d 973, 977
(Idaho 2000) ("Idaho courts have applied the 'law of the case' doctrine to preclude relitigation of
issues in cases that did not reach the Supreme Court during the first appeal.") Therefore, the
District Cou1t's grant of summary judgment to Syringa must be reversed.

3.

The District Court Erred in Holding that It had the Independent Duty to
Invalidate the Awards under the original SBPOs 1308 and 1309 and
Amendments No. 1 Thereto.

The District Court also committed reversible error in dete1mining that it had an
independent duty to invalidate the Original SBPOs 1308 and 1309 and Amendments No. 1
thereto, particularly in light of this Court's decision in City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 299 P.3d
232 (Idaho 2013). Therefore, the grant of summary judgment to Syringa must be reversed.
Indeed, at every tum in which the District Court was confronted with binding precedent
requiring it to find against Syringa, i.e., that Syringa was judicially estopped from challenging
the Original SBPOs or that judicial estoppel and res judicata precluded Syringa from amending
its Complaint to add ENA as a party, the District Court announced that it was its independent
duty to invalidate the Original SBPOs and Amendments No. 1 sua sponte. See e.g., R., p. 2033;
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R. p., 1647-48. In so holding, the District Court relied on this Court's opinion in Quiring v.

Quiring, 944 P.2d 695, 701-02 (Idaho 1997). However, Quiring is inapposite to this case.
Quiring stands for the proposition that a party to a contract cannot waive the illegality of

a contract that is void as against public policy and thereby require the Court to knowingly
enforce the contract. See id. The case at bar presents very different facts. First, Syringa is not a
party to the Original SBPOs or the Amendments No. 1. Second, the DOA did not ask the District
Comt to enforce the Amendments No. 1 (which the Court held void pursuant to its construction
of this Court's opinion in Syringa Networks). Rather, the DOA asked the District Court to
recognize the rescission of Amendments No. 1 and return the parties to the undisputedly lawful
Original SBPOs. By construing Quiring as a basis to overcome the law of the case and aid
Syringa in making an argument it could not make on its own, namely that the Original SBPOs
are anything but lawful, the District Court committed reversible error.
Further, Quiring is neither the most recent nor the most relevant directive from this Court
on the issue. Although the DOA continues to contend this doctrine of contractual illegality is
entirely inapplicable here because the DOA is not asking the Court to enforce an agreement,
even if this Comt disagrees, this Court's analysis in City of Meridian v. Petra Inc. is
considerably more on point. 299 P.3d 232. There, the City of Meridian sued its contractor
regarding deficiencies in the construction of a new city hall. /cl. at 239. In light of the
contractor's counterclaim for breach of contract, the city claimed the contractor's failure to "post
a payment and performance bond" violated LC. § 54-4512, and therefore rendered the contract
between them illegal and unenforceable. Id. at 251-52. This Court rejected the city's contention,
stating that a contract is only illegal if it "cannot be performed without violating applicable law."
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Id. at 252. Further, because the contract gave the contractor "the option to secure a bond and

provided a contractual mechanism for doing so," it was not illegal. Id. Indeed, "when the parties
executed the [contract], it was a completely legal agreement, which only later was pe1formed in
violation of the bonding statute." Id. at 253.
Similar to the underlying, valid contract in Petra, the Original SBPOs in this case have
been declared valid by this Court 10 and the District Court, 11 and Syringa has conceded as much
(and has been judicially estopped from arguing otherwise). The Original SBPOs were lawful at
their execution, and they have been the basis for the purchase of technical services by numerous
state agencies and school districts, independent of the Amendments No. 1 thereto. See R., p.
1124 (Affidavit of Greg Zickau !J[ 41-46); R., pp. 1191-94 (Affidavit of Bob Collie 1{ 12-13). As
a result, regardless of whether the Amendments No. 1 are considered illegal or rescinded, "when
the pruties executed the [Original SBPOs], [they] were[] completely legal agreement[s]." Petra,
299 P.3d at 253. In sum, there is no basis for the District Court's holding that Original SBPOs
were tainted by the Amendments No. 1 or that it has an independent duty to invalidate the
Original SBPOs.
Therefore, the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Syringa cannot be defended
on the basis of Quiring and its progeny; the District Court's decision must be reversed.

IO "The initial contracts awarded lo ENA and Qwest on January 28, 2009, constituted an award to two bidders to
furnish the same or similar property. The material provisions of their contracts were identical. There was no
differentiation as to the scope of work each was to perform under their respective contracts." Sy,-inga Networks, 305
P.3d at 504.
11 "On appeal, Syringa did not challenge the award of the original SBPOs, and conceded that the original SBPOs
were lawful." R., p. 140 I (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider). "Now, Syringa seeks to
argue that the original awards were an unlawful pretext to divide the scope of the work between Qwest and ENA.
The docu·ine of judicial estoppel precludes Syringa from having it both ways." R., p. 1402.
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4.

The District Court Erred in Permitting Syringa to Challenge a Contract
under which It Reaped Substantial Financial Benefit.

In granting summary judgment to Syringa on Count Three of the Complaint, the District

Court committed legal error by ignoring the unassailable rule that a party cannot accept a benefit
from a contract and also claim that it is invalid.
Syringa is es topped from challenging either the Original SBPOs or the Amendments No.
1 because it waived any challenge by choosing to contract with Qwest to work on the IEN
Project and thereby accept the benefits of the IEN contracts that its now claims are void. Syringa
simply cannot have it both ways: having chosen to work on the IEN Project, it forfeited any right
to challenge the IEN contracts.
Whether framed as waiver or estoppel, it is a long-standing rule of law that "a party
generally cannot accept a benefit from a procedure or action and then claim that the procedure or
act is invalid." Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 61 P.3d 557,563 (Idaho 2002) (citing

Johnson v. Pischke, 700 P.2d 19, 23 (Idaho 1985)). Indeed, this Court stated, more than 100
years ago, that the rule that a party who has received the benefits of a contract is estopped from
challenging the validity of such contract is "so well established, and is consonant with every
principle of equity and common honesty, that it needs no citation of authority to support it."

Fremont Cnty. v. Warner, 63 P. 106, 107 (Idaho 1900) (holding that party who had benefited
from the contract was "es topped from setting up the defense of ultra vires"); see also Payette

Lakes Protective Ass'n v. Lake Reservoir Co., 189 P.2d 1009, 1016 (Idaho 1948) (rejecting
appellant's argument that contract is "void as against public policy" and holding that appellant,
"having accepted the fruits," was "es topped to set up any claim of ultra vires or invalidity of the
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contract"); Moore v. Boise Land & Orchard Co., 173 P. 117, 117 (Idaho 1918) (appellant "is
estopped from asserting that the encumbrances are void").
For the last three years, Syringa has been performing and getting paid for its
telecommunication services provided for Phase I of the IEN. On April 24, 2011, sh01tly after
filing its Notice of Appeal in the first appeal in this case, Syringa executed a Master Services
Agreement with Qwest for the purchase of services needed for the IEN. See R., p. 1319
(Affidavit of Elissa Homenock, <J[<J[ 3-6, Exhs. A-C). Qwest has purchased services under the
MSA from Syringa for purposes of the IEN since that time in the following amounts: 2011:
$241,809; 2012: $543,847; and 2013: $649,710, for a total of $1,435,367. See Id. Qwest
continued to purchase and utilize services from Syringa for the IEN beyond 2013. Id.
Because Syringa chose to accept the benefits of the IEN contracts, including all
subsequent amendments, it has waived any right to challenge those contracts or amendments,
and is estopped from bringing its claims under Count Three. Simply put, Syringa "cannot accept
a benefit" from the IEN contract and then "claim that the [contracts are] invalid." 17iomas, 61
P.3d at 563. As a result, the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Syringa
notwithstanding its cognizance of the foregoing is reversible error.

5.

The District Court Committed Legal Error in Concluding that the
Severability Clause Incorporated into the Original SBPOs 1308 and 1309 Did
Not Sever Amendments No. 1 from the Original SBPOs 1308 and 1309.

In denying DOA's Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court committed reversible
legal eITor by ignoring the severability clauses incorporated into the Original SBPOs.
The "issue of severability of an agreement has been frequently addressed by" this Court.
Magic Valley Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Prof. Business Servs., Inc., 808 P.2d 1303, 1311 (Idaho
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1991). "'Whether a contract is entire or severable depends on the intention of the parties which is
to be ascertained and determined, when the contract is unambiguous, from the subject matter of
the agreement and the language used therein, taking the agreement as a whole and not its
separate parts without regard to one another."' Id. at 1312 (quoting Morgan v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 201 P.2d 976,979 (Idaho 1948)).

As established by the plain language of the standard terms and conditions incorporated
into the Original SBPOs, the Amendments No. 1, if in fact they are invalid in the first place,
must be severed from the original and lawful SBPOs. The standard severability clause
incorporated into the Original SBPOs states that "In the event any term of the Contract is held to
be invalid or unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining terms of the
Contract will remain in force." R., p. 1683 (Affidavit of Steven F. Schossberger, Ex. 1). The
intent of the parties that any unlawful amendment to the Original SBPOs be severed is
exemplified in the fact that the Original SBPOs have been the means of many state agencies and
school districts to obtain technology related services independent of the Amendments No. 1 and
the fact that neither ENA nor Qwest signed the Amendments No. 1.
The District Court rejected the argument-that the severability clause required upholding
the underlying and valid Original SBPOs even if the Amendments No. 1 were held to be
invalid-on the premise that the severability clause cannot supplant Idaho law. See R., p. 2034.
However, this ignores the purpose and import of a severability clause. A severability clause is
designed to preserve an otherwise lawful contract from the presence of a term that is later held to
be invalid. Thus, applying a severability clause does not vindicate the illegality in the severed
term, as the District Court found. Instead, it vindicates and preserves an otherwise lawful and
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/CROSS-REPSPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION'S OPENING BRIEF - 42
01152.0105 7690645.2

enforceable agreement. The latter is the result the District Court should have reached in hearing
the DOA's Motion for Reconsideration. The District Court should have found that the Original
SBPOs, which it had previously held unassailable by Syringa, could be stripped of whatever taint
it construed the Amendments No. 1 imposed. Yet, in failing to even consider the impact of the
severability clause on the Amendments No. 1, the District Court committed reversible error.

D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs to
Syringa as the Prevailing Party.
TI1e District Court abused its discretion and committed legal en-or in awarding attorney

fees and costs to Syringa, because Syringa is not the prevailing paity, the DOA's defense was not
frivolous or without support in law or fact, and the gravamen of Count Three was not a
commercial transaction between Syringa and the DOA.

1.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Holding that Syringa is the
Prevailing Party.

The District Court erroneously awarded costs and attorney fees to Syringa. Both the issue
of costs and the issue of attorney fees first require a prevailing party dete1mination. Here, the
District Court's prevailing party determination constitutes an abuse of discretion.
In Idaho state court, the prevailing party in a civil case is allowed an award or costs as a
matter of right. See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(A). To determine the prevailing party, "the trial court shall
in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B).
This Court has provided additional guidance to determine what party, if any, is the
"prevailing party" in a civil case. See Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Construction, 294 P.3d
171 (Idaho 2012). In Hobson a subcontractor sued its general contractor and the Idaho
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Department of Administration, Division of Public Works ("DPW"), when the DPW terminated
the contract between it and the general contractor under a termination for convenience clause,
which in tum led to the contractor terminating its contract with the subcontractor. See id. at 173.
The subcontractor asserted claims against the DPW for breach of contract, breach of implied
warranty, and termination for convenience. Id. In turn, the contractor asserted cross-claims
against the DPW, and the DPW filed counter- and cross-claims against the contractor and
subcontractor. Id. Finally, the subcontractor also filed suit against six state officials, which action
was consolidated with the action against the DPW. Id.
"Over the next thirty months, the district court had the opportunity to rule on multiple
motions from the parties." Id. Ultimately, after numerous motions for summary judgment, a
mistrial, and many evidentiary motions, the parties settled, except as to fees and costs. Id. at 174.
At that point, tJ1e DPW' s counter-cross-claims had been dismissed and the contractor and
subcontractor had obtained a monetary award through settlement and had ultimately prevailed on
about two thirds of the causes of action contested between the parties. See id. at 173-75. This
Court described the case as follows: "The litigation in this case spanned more than five years
with both the Contractors and DPW successfully narrowing the claims of the other before DPW
eventually settled with the Contractors without admitting liability." Id. at 177. Under these
circumstances, this Court affirmed the District Court's decision holding that neither paity was a
"prevailing party," because each prevailed in part. See id. at 177. This Court buttressed this

l.l:

holding by articulating a number of rules which are pertinent to the case at bar.
First, this Comt indicated that "the trial court has discretion to decline an award of
attorney's fees when it determines that both parties have prevailed in part." Id. at 175 (citing

I:

l
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Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, 272 P.3d 512,517 (Idaho 2012)). Another important
consideration was the principle that "lb]oth a party's successes in bringing claims and in
defending against them are important to the prevailing party analysis." Id. at 176 (emphasis
added). Thus, even though the issue is not "who succeeded on more individual claims," the Court
must determine "the extent to which each party prevailed relative to the 'final judgment or
result."' Id. at 17 5.
Here, although the District Court recognized that an award of fees was a matter subject to
its discretion, the District abused this discretion by failing to apply the appropriate standard and
failing to engage in a meaningful exercise of reason.
Indeed, in holding that Syringa lost some battles, but won the war, the District Court
ignored the natural phenomenon in a case as claims are winnowed away. Of course the final
claim that the plaintiff has left is going to look like the "be all end all" of the plaintiff's
complaint. But to focus only on that claim and the relief sought is not an exercise of reason; it's
an abuse of discretion. Indeed, the DOA successfully defeated Syringa's breach of contract claim
(Count One), claim for declaratory relief under LC.§ 67-5726 (Count Two), and tortious
interference with contract claim (Count Four). In Counts One and Four Syringa sought damages
against the DOA; through Counts Two and Three, Syringa sought declaratory relief that the
Amended Purchase Order to Qwest was void. Understanding this as the relief sought by Syringa,
and comparing it with the relief Syringa actually obtained in the February 11, 2015 Judgment
issued by the District Court, it is readily apparent that Syringa is not a "prevailing party."
The DOA prevailed over Syringa as to all claims seeking damages. The District Court's
failure to consider this fact is an abuse of discretion. In fact, Syringa sought $60,254,640 in
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damages. For prevailing party purposes, the DOA' s avoidance of having to pay any of this
staggering sum is equivalent to a plaintiff winning a money judgment. See Eighteen Mile Ranch,
LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 117 P.3d 130, 133 (Idaho 2005) ("In baseball, it is said

that a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation, avoiding
liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a plaintiff.") The DOA
also prevailed over Sryinga on one of the two claims seeking declaratory relief. In essence,
Syringa and the DOA both prevailed: the DOA was able to defeat two damages claims, one of
which Syringa purported to amount to up to $60 million dollars over twenty years, and a claim
for declaratory relief, while Syringa ultimately obtained declaratory relief, albeit erroneously, as
to one of its claims. The District Court failed to consider the entire case and the relief requested,
not just individual claims, and also failed to consider successes in defending against claims.
Therefore, in finding that Syringa was the prevailing party, the District Court abused its
discretion.
The veracity of this conclusion is cemented by this Comt' s decision on the appeal already
taken in this case. There, this Court affirmed the dismissal of five of the six counts in Syringa's
Complaint; reversing only the mu.Tow issue in Count Three of Syringa's right to challenge the
first amendment to Qwest's SBPO 1308. Yet, this Court concluded that "[b]ecause the State and
Syringa have both prevailed in part on appeal," there was not a prevailing party on appeal. See
Syringa Networks, 305 P.3d at 512. The posture of this case mirrors that same pattern now: the

DOA has been successful in defending against most of Syringa's claims; Syringa has succeeded
on one. Under such circumstances, Syringa cannot be the prevailing party.
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In sum, Syringa cannot be considered the prevailing party in this case simply because this
Court and the District Court weeded out Syringa's meritless claims at an earlier stage of the
proceeding. Seeking declaratory relief to void the Amended Purchase Orders was only one
aspect of this case at its outset and cannot now be framed as the "primary issue" due to the
Defendants' success in defending against Syringa's other claims. Syringa is not the prevailing
party, and the District Comt abused its discretion in so holding.

2.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Syringa Attorney Fees
under I.C. § 12-117.

The District Court failed to apply the appropriate standard in determining that Syringa
was entitled to recover attorney fees as the prevailing party under I.C. § 12-117. Therefore, it
abused its discretion, and the attorney fee award must be reversed.
According to LC. § 12-117, a court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party if the
Court "finds Urnt the non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." I.C.
§ 12-117(1). However, as a matter of law, "[al party did not act without reasonable basis in fact

or law if it raised an issue of first impression in Idaho or presented a legitimate question for U1is
Court to address." Hobson Fabricating, 294 P.3d at 179.
This District Court abused its discretion in awarding Syringa attorney fees under I.C.
§ 12-117(1), because it failed to apply the standard rumounced in Hobson Fabricating, namely

that raising an issue of first impression insulates that party from assuming the other party's
attorney fees and costs. Indeed, it cam1ot reasonably be argued that U1e DO A's defense of
Syringa's lawsuit lacked a reasonable basis in law or fact. The issue of administrative exhaustion
presented in this case was one of first impression. See Syringa Networks, 305 P.3d at 506
(reaching conclusion on exhaustion issue by statutory analysis as opposed to citing cases that
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already decided the issue). As a result, the DOA's defense of the lone issue upon which it did not
prevail against Syringa is per se supported by a reasonable basis in law and fact.
The District Court's conclusion on the DOA's motion for summary judgment prior to the
first appeal further confirms that the DOA's defense was supported by law and fact. Indeed, the
defense was so supported by law and fact that the District Court held in favor of the DOA, not
Syringa. Although the District Court's decision was reversed on appeal, this does not undercut
the reasonableness of the DOA' s defense. If the DOA' s defense was persuasive enough for the
District Court to agree with the DOA prior to appeal, then LC.§ 12-117 is simply inapposite.
Further, counsel for Syringa has conceded that this case involved "novel, difficult" legal
questions that "required extensive effort." R., pp. 2092-93 (Affidavit of David R. Lombardi in
Support of Plaintiff's Verified Memorandum of Costs and Request for Attorney Fees at 9{ 12.b).
Mr. Lombardi makes this representation in order to support the reasonableness of the fees billed
in pursuing Syringa' s case; however, this statement severely undercuts the contention Syringa is
trying to make at the same time, namely that the DOA should be subject to fees under I.C. § 12117. The representation made in Mr. Lombardi's affidavit and the contentions made in the
memorandum in support are mutually exclusive. Syringa is not entitled to a fee award under I.C.
§ 12-117, because the DO A's defense was per se grounded in a reasonable basis in fact and law.

Further, the District Court's parsing of the DO A's litigation position pre- and post-appeal
is likewise an abuse of discretion. Agreeing that the DOA' s pre-appeal litigation position did not
warrant fees under LC. § 12-117, the District Court nevertheless held that post-appeal the DOA' s
defense lacked foundation in law or fact. Once again, the District Court's en-oneous fixation on
this Com1's decision on standing as becoming the law of the case on the merits of Count Three
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influenced a crucial aspect of this litigation. In essence, the District Court faults the DOA for
resisting the District Court's unprecedented and improper conclusion that a decision on standing
establishes the law of the case as to the merits of the claim. As clearly set f01th above, there are
numerous decisions by this Court and others making clear that an appellate court's decision on
standing does not become the law of the case with respect to the merits. Given the District
Court's overarching legal en-or regarding the law of the case, the DOA' s resistance thereto
cannot render its litigation position frivolous. To so hold is an abuse of discretion.
Therefore, the District Court's decision awarding attorney fees to Syringa under I.C.
§ 12-117 must be reversed.

3.

The District Court Committed Legal Error in Awarding Syringa Attorney
Fees under J.C. § 12-120(3).

Because there was no commercial transaction between the DOA and Syringa, the District
Court committed legal error 12 in awarding attorney fees to Syringa pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3).
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) authorizes an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party "[ i]n
any civil action to recover on [a] ... contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares,
merchandise or services and in any commercial transaction." This Court has provided ample
guidance on this provision:
[T]he award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a
commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case.
Rather, the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises
the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate
under LC.§ 12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is
integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party
is attempting to recover. To hold otherwise would be lo convert the

I'

12 "Whether an action is based on a commercial transaction is a question of law over which this Court exercises
free review." Idaho Tra11sp. Dept. v. Ascorp, Inc., Case No. 42018, 2015 WL 5655529 at *2 (Idaho Sept. 25, 2015).

l'-
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award of attorney's fees from an exceptional remedy justified only
by statutory authority to a matter of right in virtually every lawsuit
filed.
Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 792 P.2d 345,349 (Idaho 1990).

Additional clarification on the manner in which to conduct this inquiry can be found in
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 39 P.3d 577,584 (Idaho 2001). There, the defendant (1) defeated the

plaintiff's claim for sales commissions; (2) prevailed on its counterclaim for breach of fiduciary
duty by the plaintiff; and (3) did not have its "best efforts" counterclaim against the plaintiff
submitted to the jury. See id. at 584-85. The Court engaged in a claim-by-claim analysis and
concluded that the defendant was entitled to recover attorney fees under section 12-120(3) for
defeating the plaintiff's claim for sales commission; was not entitled to recover attorney's fees
under the same section for prevailing on its breach of fiduciary duty claim, which sounded in
tort; and was not entitled to recover attorney's fees on its "best efforts" counterclaim, because it
was not submitted to the jury. See id. However, because "the district judge could not apportion
those fees that were incurred in using the breach of fiduciary duty issue as a contract defense
from those incuned in using the breach as a tort counterclaim," this Court affirmed the Trial
Court's decision not to award any attorney fees. See id. at 585.
Brower and Rockefeller make clear that section 12-120(3) requires a claim-by-claim

analysis in determining whether a contract or commercial transaction was "integral" to the
specific claim upon which the party seeking attorney's fees prevailed. This standard was recently
reaffirmed by this Court in Sims v. Jacobson, 342 P.3d 907, 911 (Idaho 2015) (internal citations
omitted):
We have interpreted [LC.§ 12-120(3)] to require courts to consider
the gravamen of each claim within the lawsuit. When a lawsuit has
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multiple claims, courts look at each individual claim to determine
what statutory basis allows attorney's fees recovery on that
claim .... In other words, courts analyze the gravamen claim by
claim.
In looking at each claim and whether there is a statutory basis under which a party could
recover attorney's fees on that claim, "the Court must analyze whether a commercial transaction
( 1) is integral to the claim and (2) constitutes the basis of the party's theory of recovery on that
claim." Id.
No commercial transaction was "integral" to Syringa's claim against the DOA under
Count Three-the only claim upon which Syringa prevailed-nor was a commercial transaction
the basis of Syringa's theory of recovery on that claim. Indeed, this issue has already been
addressed by this Court in the context of Idaho competitive bidding law in Scott v. Buhl Joint
School District No. 412, 852 P.2d 1376 (Idaho 1993).
Scott involved a lawsuit filed against a school district Urnt had requested bids on school

transp01tation and the party who ultimately won the bid. See id. at 1377. The plaintiff (the
unsuccessful bidder) claimed that the bidding process was unlawful and sought (1) a declaratory
judgment that the bidding process was invalid; (2) an injunction to stop the opposing parties
from proceeding on the contract; (3) for mandamus to award the bid to plaintiff or relet the bid;
(4) violation ofldaho procurement law; and (5) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. al 1378.
The plaintiff was unsuccessful in obtaining the relief it sought, and the successful bidder and
school district sought attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-120(3 ).
This Court concluded that attorney's fees were not wan-anted, because there was no
commercial transaction around which the claim revolved. See id. at 1383. Indeed, the plaintiff
alleged in the declaratory relief claim that the school district "failed to follow a competitive
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bidding statute, LC. § 33-1510, in awarding a contract to [the successful bidder]." Id. There was
no contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the school district or successful bidder, and
U1e plaintiff did not seek relief as against the defendants on the basis of contract or commercial
transaction. Id.
The facts of Scott are on point with those at bar. Indeed, no contract or commercial
transaction is integral, or was ever even alleged, to Count Three of Syringa's Second Amended
Post Appeal Complaint, the only claim upon which Syringa prevailed. Rather, Count Three
alleges a violation of LC. §§ 67-5718A and 5718, Idaho competitive bidding laws. There is no
allegation of a contract or commercial transaction between Syringa and the DOA. It is the
alleged violation of Idaho competitive bidding law which forms the theory of recovery on U1e
claim. As a result, Sims, Scott, Brower, and Rockefeller make clear that Syringa is not entitled to
recover attorney fees under LC. § 12-120(3). 13
In sum, to allow Syringa to recover attorney's fees under LC.§ 12-120(3) when the only
claim upon which it prevailed did not involve a contract or commercial transaction "would be to

convert the award of attorney's fees from an exceptional remedy justified only by statutory
authority to a matter of right in virtually every lawsuit filed." Brower, 792 P.2d at 349.
The District Court's legal error in awarding attorney fees to Syringa llllder I.C. § 12120(3) is clear from the language of its decision: "The commercial transaction is the solicitation
and award of the design and implementation of the Idaho Education Network. Due to DOA's
)

}

unlawful division of the scope of the work between Qwest and ENA, Syringa has standing to

13 This Court's decision in Syri11ga Networks denying Qwest's entitlement to attorney fees against Syringa under
LC. § 12-120(3) for want of a commercial transaction between them further confirms this point. See 305 P.3d at
506-10.
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challenge the awards." R., pp. 2366-67. This holding misapplies the standard identified above.
While there was a commercial transaction between the DOA and ENA, and the DOA and Qwest,
Syringa was party to neither. There was no commercial transaction between the DOA and
Syringa. As a result, the District Court committed reversible legal error.
4.

Syringa is Not Entitled to Recover Attorney Fees under I.C. § 12-121.

The District Court again abused its discretion in awarding Syringa attorney fees w1der
I.C. § 12-121, because it failed to apply the correct legal standard and perpetuated its
misapplication of the law of the case doctrine to another aspect of this case.
Section 12-121 authorizes an award of "reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing
party." I.C. § 12-121. However, an award of attorney's fees may only hold under this provision
where "'the court detem1ines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation."' Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 302 P.3d 349,356 (Idaho 2013)
(quoting Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 177 P.3d 965, 965-66
(Idaho 2008)). In making this detern1ination, the Court must consider "the 'entire course of the
litigation ... and if there is at least one legitimate issue presented, attorney's fees may not be
awarded even though the losing party has asserted other factual or legal claims that are frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation."' Id. ( quoting Michalk v. Michalk, 220 P .3d 580, 591
(Idaho 2009)). Finally, "[w]here a case involves a novel legal question, attorney's fees should
not be granted under I.C. § 12-121." Campbell v. Kildew, 115 P.3d 731, 742 (Idaho 2005).
The District Court's abuse of discretion in awarding attorney fees to Syringa under LC.
§ 12-121 is abundantly clear. Indeed, its award of attorney fees to Syringa post-remand, but not

pre-appeal, is utterly inconsistent with Phillips. By recognizing that the DOA's defense
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presented was "legitimate" prior to the first appeal, the District Court could not then hold that
"other factual or legal claims" of the DOA "are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."
See Phillips, 302 P.3d at 356. The District Court failed to consider U1e litigation as a whole, and
therefore failed to apply the correct legal standard.
In addition, tile District Court's failure to consider the entire course of proceedings is
evident when considering that the DOA prevailed on its defense of every claim leveled by
Syringa except one, and that one exceptional claim involved an issue of first impression.
Therefore, the District Court's award of attorney fees to Syringa under I.C. § 12-121 is
unsupportable.
Furthennore, the District Court's decision here was likewise dominated by its erroneous
application of the law of the case doctrine. The DOA' s resistance to the District Court's
unprecedented and unsupportable conclusion tilat this Court's finding on standing somehow
reached the merits of Syringa's claim cannot be "frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation."
In sum, the District Court's misapplication of LC. § 12-121 and associated case law is an
abuse of discretion that must be reversed by tilis Court.

5.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Attorney Fees to
Syringa Where Syringa Could Not Differentiate between Work Performed
on Claims on which It Did Not Prevail and Count Three.

Even assuming (1) U1at Syringa is the prevailing party (which it is not), and (2) that it is
entitled to some portion of an attorney's fees under one of tile cited statutory provisions (which it
is not) the District Court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Syringa, because
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Syringa failed to distinguish between time spent litigating tJ1e other claims and time spent
litigating Count Three.
In Rocke.feller, this Court reaffirmed the general rule that attorney's fees are not available
where the District Court cannot differentiate between time spent on a claim to which attorney
fees are not warranted and time spent on a claim to which attorney fees are warranted. See 39
P.3d at 585. Instead of making an effort to distinguish between time spent on Count Three and
tJ1e other claims, the District Court blessed Syringa's request for $866,015 in attorney fees.
Because Syringa has failed lo distinguish between attorney fees incurred in pursuing
claims on which it has not prevailed from others incurred in pursuing Count Three, Rocke.feller
dictates tJ1at Syringa is not entitled to any attorney fees. See 39 P.3d at 585. Even if this Court
concludes otherwise, there is no basis to conclude that Syringa can recover the attorney fees it
incurred in pursuing five unsuccessful claims, simply because it obtained relief on one. Thus, in
failing lo require Syringa to differentiate between time spent on Count Three and time spent on
other claims as required by Rockefeller, the District Court has abused its discretion.

V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the DOA respectfully requests that this Court reverse tJ1e District
Court's award of summary judgment to Syringa and tJ1e District Court's denial of the DOA's
motion for summary judgment, and declare that the original SBPOs were lawful and valid
contracts. The DOA also respectfully requests tJ1at tJ1is Court reverse the District Court's awm-d
of attorney fees and costs to Syringa.
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